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The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration

I. Introduction
International trade and investment arbitration are distinct disciplines within the field
of international economic law. Practitioners and scholars in one field rarely labor in the
vineyards of the other. Yet the trade and investment arbitration regimes routinely
overlap and are increasingly converging. They promote similar objectives—globalization,
economic integration, trade promotion, and investment protection. They are often
embedded in the same treaties, such as part of preferential trade agreements. They
incorporate similar substantive protections, particularly the rules against discrimination
and protectionism. They both use international tribunals as the vehicle for dispute
settlement, thereby allowing for judicial review of sovereign state violations of
international law. As of late, they both use the economic leverage of tariff benefits to
secure compliance with adverse judicial decisions. They both are on the ascendance, with
countries clamoring to reap the rewards of membership in each club.
There are, of course, numerous differences between the trade and investment regimes
worthy of examination. In many respects, the two disciplines are distinct, and it is
therefore little surprise that the academy and the bar do not treat them as a single legal
order. However, for purposes of this paper, I wish to focus on the overlap and convergence
between the trade and investment regimes.
Part I of this paper addresses will address the trend toward incorporating investment
arbitration chapters in preferential trade agreements, thus reflecting the need for deeper
forms of legal protection in response to the changing nature of international trade,
particularly the intra-firm globalized chains of supply. Corporate outsourcing of
production generates tremendous demand for lower trade costs and enhanced investment
protections. Part II concerns the converging commitments in trade and investment
arbitration against protectionism and discrimination. Although the national treatment
tests embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements differ from that in
most bilateral investment treaties (BITs), both regimes are concerned with establishing
rules to effectively regulate different forms of de facto or de jure discrimination. The other
points of convergence focus on various aspects of dispute settlement. Part III discusses
the trend toward parallel WTO and BIT proceedings, which is only possible through the
convergence of substantive norms. This convergence encourages a foreign investor, who is
independently pursuing a BIT claim to contemporaneously persuade its home
government to diplomatically espouse a WTO claim. Part IV addresses the use of trade
remedies to enforce arbitration awards. This has occurred when a developed country
(such as the United States) threatens to remove preferential trade benefits to a
developing country (such as Argentina) if the developing country does not honor its
international arbitration commitments. Part V addresses the emerging trend of relying
on investment arbitration to enforce international trade rights. Despite the assumption
that international trade disputes must be resolved before the WTO Dispute Settlement
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Body, the existence of broad umbrella clauses in BITs presents an emerging vehicle for
enforcing investment commitments in trade agreements.

II. Investment Chapters and Preferential Trade Agreements
The most obvious point of convergence between international trade and arbitration is
evident in the increasingly common practice of combining trade and investment
arbitration in a single treaty. The most frequent manifestation of this trend is in the
investment chapters embedded in preferential trade agreements (PTAs).1 Most
scholarship on investment arbitration focuses on BITs, and diminishes the importance of
investment chapters in PTAs.2 This is despite the fact that the number of BITs is on the
decline and the number of PTAs with investment chapters is on the rise.3 A characteristic
feature of PTAs is that they “combine foreign direct investment . . . and trade to create
global supply chains that maximize productivity through the distribution of production
among a number of countries.”4
In a recent study on PTAs, 587 agreements between 3310 countries, dating from 1945
to 2009, were coded based on their content.5 Of these PTAs, 37% (217 agreements)
included investment provisions and 13% (76 agreements) included an investor-host State
dispute settlement mechanism.6 The study distinguished between “shallow” and “deep”
PTAs, with the latter including measures “that do not directly concern trade—such as
those protecting investments and intellectual property rights and those opening
government procurement to foreign bidders.”7 According to the study, the positive trade
effects of deep PTAs “substantially outperform” baseline GATT/WTO trade
relationships.8 Moreover, “the deeper a PTA, the larger is its effect on trade flows
between member countries.”9
Why would countries sign deep PTAs with investment chapters instead of simply
relying on shallow PTAs, the WTO, or BITs? The answer depends on the nature of the
trading relationship. PTAs with investment chapters are positively and significantly

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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See infra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND
INTERPRETATION (2010); RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, ICSID, BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES (1995).
Sébastien Miroudot, Investment, in PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR
DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK, 307, 308 fig.14.1 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christoph Maur,
eds., 2011).
Id.
Andreas Dür, Leonardo Baccini, Manfred Elsig, & Karolina Milewicz, The Design of International
Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Database, 1, 6 (2012) available at
https://www.dvpw.de/fileadmin/docs/Kongress2012/Paperroom/2012IB-Duer.pdf.
Id. at 11 fig.4.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 23 tbl.3.
Id. at 19.
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correlated with intra-firm trade and vertical foreign direct investment.10 “Intra-firm
trade” occurs as a result of globalized outsourcing, that is, when the components of a final
product are produced or assembled by affiliated companies in two or more countries and
exported back to the home country.11
“[C]ountries are more likely to sign” deep PTAs “when intra firm trade is at the higher
ends of the value-added chain.”12 Moreover, intra-firm trade is negatively correlated with
BITs and shallow PTAs.13 In other words, vertical foreign direct investment resulting
from globalized supply chains increases the demand for investment chapters in PTAs.
The data indicates that when compared to BITs and shallow PTAs, deep PTAs with
investment chapters are generally signed when countries are wealthier and when intrafirm trade is at the higher ends of the value-added chain.14 In short, deep PTAs are
particularly desirable when trade is between rich countries and relates to verticallyintegrated production methods that require large capital investments.
According to a WTO study conducted in 2011, following the signing of deep PTAs,
trade in production networks between member countries increased by almost 35%.15
Deep PTAs with investment chapters also have a greater impact on trade flows in some
sectors than others. The same study calculated an increase in trade in the automotive
parts and information and communication technology of 81 and 56%, respectively, as
compared to only 20% in textiles.16 This suggests that capital-intensive industries that
incorporate significant technological know-how and intellectual property are more
responsive to deep PTAs.
Deep PTAs with investment chapters mitigate the risks associated with trade and
investment that are critical for successful global chains of supply. The preferential trade
component of such agreements makes it comparatively cheaper for multinational
corporations to secure supply chain inputs from the host country, while the investment
protections protect against the political risks associated with large capital investments,

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Raymond Hicks & Kris Johnson, When a BIT Just Isn’t Enough: Why We See Investment Chapters
in Preferential Trade Agreements 27 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD POLITICS, 1, 8 (2010) (“[V]ertical FDI be the main
motivation for multi-nationals looking to invest in developing countries, and thus we should
expect them to demand PTAs as well as BITs.”); Miroudot, supra note 3, at 307, 318 (“Vertical FDI
is associated with efficiency-seeking strategies . . . . [A] PTA is likely to increase FDI through both
its trade and its investment provisions.”).
Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 9.
Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 28.
Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 28.
Hicks & Johnson, supra note 10, at 6, 28, 32-33.
Gianluca Orefice & Nadia Rocha, Deep Integration and Production Networks: An Empirical
Analysis,
1,
4,
19
(July
2011),
available
at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/
reser_e/ersd2011_e.pdf.
Id. at 14, 19, 28 tbl.5.
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such as expropriation, denial of justice, and discriminatory treatment, and other
governmental misconduct. Further, deep PTAs respond to and reflect the needs of
vertically-integrated, globalized, multinational corporations. Globalized production lines
cannot operate smoothly unless national policies are harmonized. To this end, deep PTAs
foster integration with respect to infrastructure, institutions, and product regulations,
thus securing cross-border production.17
BITs are effective at protecting foreign investors who seek access to the host State’s
market. The WTO is effective at providing fundamental guarantees with respect to
liberalized trade. The guarantees in BITs and the WTO, thus, are baseline protections
that reflect international minimum standards that nations accord to every other trading
partner. They embody an ‘Economic Bill of Rights’ of sorts for international relations, the
least common denominator of normal trading relations.
Deep PTAs with investment chapters, by contrast, are about special trading partners.
They give access to an inner circle of rights that are reserved for privileged economic
relationships. They seek to minimize trade costs, maximize market access, and
harmonize cross-border regulatory standards. Fundamentally, deep PTAs are concerned
with vertical integration and efficient global production lines. Thus, as intra-firm trade
and global supply chains proliferate, so shall also PTAs with investment chapters. The
deepening of international economic relations portends new types of trade and
investment protections. The effective management of trade and investment risks is
promoting the convergence of trade and investment arbitration.

III.Convergence of Trade and Arbitration Norms
In many respects, the international norms reflected in the WTO differ from those
guaranteed in BITs. The WTO agreements are concerned with trade liberalization, while
BITs are concerned with investment protection. Many WTO norms, such as those
addressing tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and unilateral trade remedies have no corollary in
BITs. Likewise, BIT protections against unlawful expropriation, denial of justice, and the
guarantee of full protection and security have no corollary in the WTO agreements.
However, a common denominator in both the trade and investment treaties is the
norm against discrimination.18 Under the WTO’s national treatment obligation, “[t]he

17.

18.
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Id. at 2-3 (“In order for cross-border production to operate smoothly, certain national policies need
to be harmonized to facilitate business activities taking place in several countries. This generates
a demand for deep forms of integration. In other words, agreements that include disciplines such
as infrastructure, institutions, competition policy, the standardization and harmonization of
product regulations, amongst others, would make production sharing activities more secure and
less likely to encounter disruptions or restrictions.”).
If space permitted, one could also discuss convergence with respect to emergency exceptions.
Although the non-self-judging economic emergency exceptions in BITs such as the United StatesArgentina Bilateral Investment Treaty are distinct from the WTO’s self-judging national security
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products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be accorded no less favourable treatment than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect to all laws, regulations, and requirements . . .
.”19 BITs also include a similar national treatment obligation. The national treatment
obligation embodied in the NAFTA, for example, provides that “[e]ach Party shall accord
to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments.”20
Arbitral tribunals interpreting the national treatment obligation in NAFTA have
routinely considered WTO jurisprudence in resolving whether a foreign investor has been
accorded no less favorable treatment than domestic investors in like circumstances.21 In
SD Myers v. Canada, the tribunal noted that the WTO national treatment obligation
must be read in context, and that context included general exceptions relating to
environmental protection.22 It then construed NAFTA’s national treatment obligation—
which includes no express environmental exception—to be subject to the environmental

19.
20.
21.
22.

exception, investment tribunals routinely have relied on WTO jurisprudence in interpreting BIT
emergency exceptions. See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. AEB/03/9, Award,
¶¶ 182-88 (Sept. 5, 2008); Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶
331 (May 22, 2007); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8,
Annulment Proceeding, ¶¶ 119-27 (Sept. 25, 2007); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 379-83 (Sept. 28, 2007); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶¶ 212-13 (Oct. 3, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission
Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶¶ 370-73 (May 12, 2005); See
generally Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 3 UTAH L. REV. 697, 737-39
& n.272 (2011); JÜrgen Kurtz, Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law:
Security, Public Order and Financial Crisis, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325, 339, 348–49 (2010);
Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 459, 503–05 (Peter Muchlinski,
Ferderico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer, eds., 2008). Moreover, the latest version of the United
States Model BIT mirrors in many respects the WTO security exception and could represent a
type of convergence. Moreover, the latest version of the United States Model BIT mirrors in many
respects the WTO security exception and could represent a type of convergence. Alford, supra note
19, at 739; Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 18, 2004,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Model
BIT].
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187[
hereinafter GATT]. Similarly, GATT, art. III(1) imposes national treatment obligations with
respect to internal taxes and other internal charges.
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1102(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA, art. 1102(2), includes similar national treatment
language with respect to investments.
For a detailed analysis of these cases, see Jürgen Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in
Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2009).
S.D. Myers v. Canada, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., 1st Partial Award, ¶¶ 244-247 (Nov 13, 2000),
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf.
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policies that form part of NAFTA’s context.23 In Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the arbitral
tribunal analyzed WTO jurisprudence and rejected the respondent State’s narrow
definition of what constituted discriminatory treatment.24 In a third case, Occidental v.
Ecuador, the arbitral tribunal compared the text of the national treatment provision in
the BIT with the text of the national treatment provision in the WTO.25 The arbitral
tribunal concluded that “like situations” were not the same as “like products”, and
therefore the foreign investors receiving discriminatory treatment did not need to stand
in a competitive relationship with the domestic companies receiving the preferential
treatment. Finally, in Methanex v. United States, the arbitral tribunal painstakingly
compared the WTO national treatment provisions with various provisions in NAFTA to
conclude that “like circumstances” could not be interpreted to mean “like products.”26
Whether or not these tribunals reached the correct result, the comparative analysis is
worth emphasizing. The leading investment cases interpreting the meaning of national
treatment presumed the relevance of WTO jurisprudence. “Like products” in GATT is
evidently not the same question as whether foreign and domestic investors are in “like
circumstances.” Nevertheless, the pull toward reliance on the WTO as persuasive
authority appears almost irresistible.27
Of course, “like circumstances” are not “like investors.” A “like circumstance” is a
state of affairs, a condition or factor influencing an investor’s regulatory experience.28
The question is not the indicia of investor likeness, but rather on whether there are “any
legitimate reason to distinguish between the foreign and domestic investments in the
specific circumstances surrounding [the government regulation].”29 Despite the fact that
the WTO has a different text, different object and purpose, different context, different

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
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Id. ¶ 247.
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award on Merits, ¶¶ 45-72 (Apr. 10,
2001), http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf.
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Award, ¶¶
173-177 (London Ct. Int'l Arb. 2004).
Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Final Award, ¶¶ 29-38 (Aug. 3,
2005), 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1446-1449,), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
51052.pdf.
I say “almost” because on occasion investment tribunals resolve national treatment claims with no
apparent concern for the WTO analogy. See, e.g., United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada,
NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award on the Merits, ¶¶ 80-119 (May 24, 2007). In his dissent in UPS
v. Canada, Arbitrator Ronald Cass argued that “[t]he wording of Article 1102 suggests a very close
parallel to the national treatment obligations contained in the GATT and the GATS, as well as
other international trade and investment agreements and treaties. . . [Article 1102] commands an
effective parity of foreign and domestic investors and investments . . . a reading [that] is consistent
. . . with precedent under GATT and WTO.” See id. ¶¶ 57-61 (Separate Statement of Dean Ronald
A. Cass).
Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties:
Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 85 (2008).
Id.
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institutional framework, and a different remedy, arbitral tribunals cannot avoid the
WTO comparison.
The choice of a WTO analogy only adds to the confusion. The national treatment
standard in GATS is a closer analogy than that in GATT, requiring each Member to
“accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures
affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.”30 This test presumes a competitive relationship
between foreign and domestic services, but at least is not burdened with the irrelevant
qualitative assessments of “like products” in WTO jurisprudence, much less the
nettlesome distinction between “like products” and “directly competitive or substitutable
products.”31
An even better WTO analog than GATS would be TRIPS. Article 3 of TRIPs states
that “[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favourable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property.”32 Like the BIT standard, there is no suggestion in TRIPs that
foreign and domestic nationals stand in a competitive relationship. The concern, rather,
is about equality of treatment as between domestic and foreign nationals with respect to
the regulation and protection of intellectual property rights.33
So why do investment tribunals continue to grasp for inapposite analogies from the
existing WTO jurisprudence? Perhaps it is because WTO law is seen as “any relevant
rule of international law applicable in the relation between the parties.”34 On this
theory, the WTO is part of the larger BIT context, and one cannot interpret the national
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.

See General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XVII, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter “GATS”].
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. III:1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter GATT].
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(1995) [hereinafter TRIPs].
Another analogy is Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which
provides that “Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin . . . ” Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120. See United States-Measures Affecting the
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, ¶¶ 116-119 (Apr. 24, 2012). Similar
to the national treatment standard in BITs, the TBT’s national treatment standard is not
subject to a general exception. See Joost Pauwelyn, What Does Clove Cigarettes Mean for
Discrimination Under GATT and Investment Treaties, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND
POLICY BLOG (Sept. 14, 2011), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2011/09/what-doescloves-cigarettes-mean-for-discrimination-under-gatt-and-investment-treaties.html.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (the
treaty interpreter shall take into account “any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties.”); see generally Gaetan Verhoosel, The Use of Investor-State
Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Treaties to Seek Relief for Breaches of WTO Law, 6 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 493, 503-04 (2003).
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treatment standard in BITs without taking into consideration how the WTO has
interpreted its own national treatment standards.
Or perhaps it is because both trade and investment tribunals are struggling with the
same core issue of designing a “national treatment test that eliminates discrimination
against foreigners without encroaching too far upon domestic regulatory sovereignty.”35
In both cases the concern is about establishing rules to regulate de facto or de jure
protectionism or disparate treatment. Accordingly, key insights may be drawn across the
regimes in light of the common and unifying purpose of fashioning a national treatment
test. Comparative analysis of the national treatment standard is in search of a “cohesive
international economic law.”36

IV. Parallel Proceedings
The convergence of substantive norms gives occasion for the same government
measure to generate parallel trade and investment proceedings. Foreign investors by
definition are engaged in the international trade of goods and services. When they are
adversely affected by a government measure, they will consider all relevant avenues of
dispute resolution. Occasionally both investment arbitration and WTO dispute
settlement are viable options. This allows a multinational corporation to convince its
home government to diplomatically espouse a WTO claim while it pursues in its own
right a BIT claim.
As a matter of substantive right, the same set of facts may trigger both investment
and trade claims. An import ban on goods or services may give rise to a colorable claim
of an indirect expropriation under an investment treaty and a quantitative restriction
violation under GATT or a market access violation under GATS.37 The imposition of
performance requirements may give rise to a TRIMs or a GATs claim and a BIT claim.38
Rank protectionism may lead to a WTO national treatment claim or a BIT claim for fair

35.
36.
37.

38.
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Verhoosel, supra note 34, at 89.
Robert Howse & Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State
Arbitration: A Reply to Jürgen Kurtz, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1087, 1094 (2009).
See, e.g., GATT art. XI; GATS art.__NAFTA, art. 1110; Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 40 ILM 36 (2001)
(expropriation under Article 1110 includes “covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in part, of the use or reasonablyto-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host State.”) *Check article number with author.
See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. II, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 (1995)
[hereinafter TRIMs]; GATS arts. I, XVII; NAFTA art. 1106. *Is author referring to TRIM treaty or
to the TRIP treaty? TRIM has not been introduced prior to this reference, either in the article or
as a footnote. Double-check with the author.
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and equitable treatment.39 Preferential treatment toward investors from a particular
country may be prohibited by the MFN clauses in GATT, GATS, and BITs.40
Such parallel proceedings have occurred on at least three occasions in recent years.
With respect to the longstanding softwood lumber dispute between Canada and the
United States, the WTO has addressed over half a dozen times the legality of United
States tariff duties imposed on Canadian softwood lumber following highly contested
domestic AD/CVD proceedings.41 Among the most controversial of the United States
measures implicated in the softwood lumber dispute was the so-called “Byrd
Amendment,”42 which earmarked collected AD/CVD tariff duties for distribution to
domestic competitors.43
While WTO proceedings were ongoing, Canadian softwood lumber producers brought
investment arbitration claims against the United States alleging violations of NAFTA
guarantees relating to national treatment, MFN, fair and equitable treatment, and
expropriation.44 These investor claims were consolidated,45 and, with the exception of the
Byrd Amendment, subsequently dismissed.46 The Byrd Amendment was subsequently

39.
40.
41.

42.

43.
44.

45.
46.

See, e.g., GATT art. III; NAFTA art. 1105.
See, e.g., GATT art. I; GATS art. II; NAFTA art. 1103.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation
of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW
(Apr. 13, 2006); Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination
With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005);
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from
Canada, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004); Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the
International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004);
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004); Panel Report, United
States—Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,
WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002).
Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-387, §§ 1001–03, 114 Stat. 1549, 1549A-72 to 1549A75, repealed by Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154. See
generally Tudor N. Rus, The Short, Unhappy Life of the Byrd Amendment, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 427 (2007); Claire Hervey, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Politics at the
WTO, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131 (2003).
Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003).
Tembec, Inc. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Notice of Arbitration and Statement
of Claim (Dec. 3, 2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27805.pdf; Terminal
Forest Products Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Notice of Arbitration (Mar.
31, 2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31360.pdf; Canfor Corp. v. United
States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim (July 9, 2002),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13203.pdf.
Canfor Corp. et. al. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Order of the Consolidation
Tribunal, (Sept. 7, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53113.pdf.
The reason for the dismissal was because another NAFTA article was held to preclude
investment claims over any AD/CVD matter. Canfor Corp. et. al. v. United States,
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adjudicated before both the WTO and NAFTA tribunals. The two tribunals reached
contradictory results. The NAFTA tribunal concluded that the Byrd Amendment was not
a dumping and subsidies measure within the meaning of NAFTA,47 while the WTO
Appellate Body concluded that it was a dumping and subsidies measure within the
meaning of the WTO.48
The Byrd Amendment was repealed in early 2006.49 In late 2006 Canada and the
United States reached a political settlement through the signing of the Softwood Lumber
Agreement (“SLA”) and, as a condition to the entry into force of the SLA, the NAFTA
Consequently, the full effect of parallel
claims were subsequently dismissed.50
proceedings and the conflicting results rendered by those tribunals was never realized.51
The next major instance of parallel proceedings arose in the context of Mexican taxes
and duties on various sweeteners. One such measure was a twenty percent tax on soft
drinks and other beverages that use a sweetener other than sugar.52 Mexico’s actions
gave rise to litigation before the WTO and NAFTA Chapter 19, and investment
arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11.53
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NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Decision on Preliminary Question, ¶¶ 188-273 (June 6, 2006)
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http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/67753.pdf; John Crook, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law: NAFTA Panel Dismisses Chapter 11
Challenges to U.S. Administration of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, Allows
Byrd Claim to Proceed, 101 AMER. J. INT’L L. 185, 222 (2007).
Canfor Corp. et. al. v. United States, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Decision on Preliminary
Question, ¶¶ 274-349 (June 6, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/67753.pdf. A
closer look suggests that the Byrd Amendment would have fallen within the definition of an
AD/CVD measure within the meaning of NAFTA Article 1901(3) if the United States had followed
the necessary procedural steps required by NAFTA Article 1901(2). See id. ¶ 334.
Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Dumping and Subsidies Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R, ¶¶ 240-42 (Jan. 16, 2003).
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154 (2006); see generally
Rus, supra note 42, at 435-438.
Softwood Lumber Agreement between Canada and the United States, U.S.-Can., art. II, Annex
2A, Sept. 12, 2006, TIAS. For a discussion of the parallel proceedings in the softwood lumber
dispute, see Andrea Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition
Among International Economic Law Tribunals is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 241, 274-286
(2007); Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-NAFTA “Spaghetti
Bowl” is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 197, 197-205 (2006); Chi Carmody, Softwood Lumber Dispute
(2001-2006), 100 AMER. J. INT’L L. 664 (2006).
For a discussion of the parallel proceedings in the softwood lumber dispute, see Leonila Guglya,
The Dispute Settlement Architecture of the Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006: The Interplay of
Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in the Late Phases of the Softwood Lumber Controversy, in 8
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (SPECIAL ISSUE: INTERSECTIONS: DISSEMBLANCE OR CONVERGENCE
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW) 3 (Sept. 2011).
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/AB/R, ¶ 2 (Mar. 6, 2006).
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup
(HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001); Panel Report, Mexico—AntiDumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS) from the United States, WT/DS132/R
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The soft drink tax was imposed after Mexico repealed its unlawful antidumping
duties, but the WTO Appellate Body found that the soft drink taxes violated WTO
guarantees of national treatment and were not justified under any applicable exception.54
The fact that the tax was imposed as a retaliatory countermeasure in response to the
United States’ refusal to comply with its NAFTA obligations did not justify the measure
under the WTO.55
In the investment arbitration in Archer Daniels Midland v. Mexico, the tribunal ruled
that the soft drink tax violated NAFTA investment provisions by imposing domestic
performance requirements and violating national treatment obligations.56 It awarded
$33 million in damages for these violations.57 Tribunals in the related cases of Corn
Products v. Mexico and Cargill v. Mexico likewise found, inter alia, a NAFTA national
treatment violation and awarded damages of $58.4 million and $77.3 million,
respectively.58
Mexico repealed the unlawful measures pursuant to a bilateral agreement between
the United States and Mexico dated July 27, 2006.59 The agreement not only guaranteed
U.S. sugar and corn sweetener producers with access to the Mexican market, but it also
guaranteed reciprocal access by Mexican producers to the U.S. market.60 Had the WTO
been the only forum to adjudicate the dispute, such prospective relief would have been
the end of the matter. But the successful pursuit of NAFTA investment claims confirmed
the possibility that parallel proceedings may serve to achieve both prospective and
retroactive relief, with foreign investors receiving almost $170 million in damages for
injuries suffered as a result of Mexico’s unlawful taxes.61 In this respect parallel WTO
and NAFTA proceedings complemented one another.
In another sense, however, this dispute illustrates how WTO and NAFTA proceedings
may be a source of conflict. In all three NAFTA proceedings, Mexico argued that its
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(Jan. 28, 2000).
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WT/DS308/AB/R, ¶¶ 58-84 (Mar. 6, 2006).
Id. ¶¶ 79-80.
Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05 (Nov.
21, 2007).
Id. ¶¶ 287-300.
Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/01 (Jan.
15, 2008); Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 559
(Sept. 18, 2009).
See Letter from Richard Crowder, Ambassador, US Trade Rep., to Lic. Angel Villalobos
Rodriguez, Undersecretary, Int’l Trade Negotiations (Jul. 27, 2006) (archived at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/NAFTA/asset_upload_file694_
10810.pdf); Magda Kornis, U.S. Corn Sweeteners and Mexico Sugar: Agreement at Last!, J.
INT’L COMM. & ECON. 1 (Dec. 2006).
Id. at 10.
Chad Bond, NAFTA Update and Trade News Highlights from February 2011 through April 2011,
17 L. & BUS. REV. OF THE AMERICAS 613, 613 (2011).
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conduct was a legitimate countermeasure in response to United States’ international law
violations. That defense failed for reasons unique to the disputes, but the NAFTA
tribunals clearly were sympathetic to foreign investors’ arguments that even legitimate
countermeasures could give rise to investment claims, because BIT guarantees are owed
to the investor, not the investors’ home State.62 The question thus arises whether the
WTO may sanction retaliatory countermeasures for WTO violations, but foreign investors
nonetheless may sue for any resulting injuries from such WTO-sanctioned
countermeasures. If so, then the most effective tool to secure compliance with WTO
obligations may trigger investment arbitration. Investment protections may limit a
foreign investor’s exposure to retaliatory countermeasures imposed because its home
country refuses to comply with WTO obligations.63
The third significant example of parallel proceedings involves the recent filing of WTO
and BIT claims relating to Australia’s Tobacco Plain Packaging Act (“PPA”).64 The
Australian legislation prohibits the branding of tobacco products and regulates almost
every aspect of the appearance, size and shape of tobacco packaging, with civil and
criminal penalties for importing, packaging, or manufacturing non-compliant products.65
Such measures have prompted both trade and investment litigation. In the disputes
now pending before the WTO, Ukraine, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic have
argued, inter alia, that the PPA violated various TRIPs provisions by (1) unjustifiably
encumbering the use of a trademark by special requirements, (2) preventing owners from
enjoying the rights conferred by trademark, and (3) failing to provide effective protection
against unfair competition with respect to geographic indications.66
Meanwhile, Philip Morris has brought a BIT claim against Australia alleging the PPA
constitutes an unlawful expropriation of its intellectual property, violates fair and
62.
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64.
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Id.
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Products and Packaging, WT/DS435/1 (Apr. 10, 2012); Request for Consultation by Honduras,
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Packaging, WT/DS/434/1 (Mar. 15, 2012).
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equitable treatment, guarantees of full protection and security, and umbrella clause
guarantees.67 Australia, not surprisingly, denies the allegations.68
While these international proceedings are ongoing, the tobacco industry has launched
a third avenue of attack by pursuing litigation in Australian courts. The Australian
Supreme Court has already weighed in regarding the constitutionality of the PPA,
finding that “the mere restriction on a right of property or even its extinction do not
necessarily mean that a propriety right has been acquired by another.”69
Trade and investment tribunals must now determine whether their rules protecting
intellectual property rights can accommodate exceptions for health and public safety.70
The WTO Agreements incorporate general exceptions necessary to protect human health
and safety, but the Hong Kong-Australia BIT includes no such exception.71 The evidence
to support the government’s health claims also will be tested, with the scientific
standards in investment arbitration uncertain, while the WTO imposes stringent
scientific standards to establish that plain packaging demonstrably alters consumer
behavior.72
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For a discussion of the likely success of the WTO case, see Tania S. Voon and Andrew D.
Mitchell, Implications of WTO Law for Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products, in PUBLIC
HEALTH AND PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES LEGAL ISSUES (A. Mitchell, T. Voon, and J.
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SA
(Jul.
23,
2009),
(available
at
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Philip Morris’ investment arbitration claim, Benn McGrady, Implications of Ongoing Trade
and Investment Disputes Concerning Tobacco: Philip Morris v. Uruguay, in PUBLIC HEALTH
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(2011),
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Parallel proceedings in the plain packaging context illustrate a willingness by
multinational corporations to pursue all possible avenues of relief in response to onerous
government regulation. Trade and investment litigation is a key part of that strategy.
Philip Morris restructured its investment to capitalize on Hong Kong-Australia BIT
protections, with Hong Kong-based Philip Morris Asia acquiring its interest in Philip
Morris Australia in February 2011 after the plain packaging dispute arose.73 It also
engaged in “diplomatic espousal shopping,” with the tobacco industry searching the globe
for countries willing to initiate a WTO proceeding on its behalf, and funding countries
like Ukraine, which has not exported tobacco to Australia in years, to litigate the WTO
complaint.74 At a minimum litigation before international trade and investment tribunals
may cause countries such as the EU, Canada and New Zealand to delay adopting their
own plain packaging measures. It also could increase the transaction costs of tobacco
legislation. It also could increase the transaction costs of tobacco legislation. In the
absence of stare decisis and non-mutual collateral estoppel in either trade litigation or
investment arbitration, the tobacco industry can relitigate the same question again and
again as each additional country adopts plain packaging legislation.

V. Trade Remedies to Enforce Arbitration Awards
One of the most significant developments signaling the convergence of trade and
arbitration is the use of trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards. This is done
primarily when a developed country threatens to remove preferential trade benefits to a
developing country if that country does not honor its international arbitration
commitments.
The WTO allows (but does not require) developed countries to grant preferential trade
benefits to “promote the development, financial and trade needs of developing
countries.”75 Many developed countries—including Australia, Canada, the European
Union, and the United States—have established such “Generalized System of
Preferences” or GSPs to promote trade with developing countries.76 The major benefit of
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GSP schemes is the unilaterally lowering of tariff bowers for products from beneficiary
countries without a corresponding reduction in tariffs for the developed country’s
products.
The discretionary nature of these schemes means that the trade benefits come with
strings attached. In the United States and the European Union, for example, developing
countries are subject to performance obligations with respect to matters such as drug
trafficking, international terrorism, democracy, human rights, environmental protection,
government corruption, unlawful expropriation, the rule of law, and good governance.77
The United States imposes a number of conditions on beneficiary countries, including
that they recognize and enforce arbitral awards in favor of United States nationals.78
Any country that wishes to secure beneficiary status under the GSP scheme must satisfy
this criterion,79 and any country that fails to maintain this commitment jeopardizes their
beneficiary status. The provision was added to the Trade Act of 197480 because of
concerns that it was “contrary to sound U.S. policy to give…any… developing nation the
favored treatment contemplated by the present legislation in the face of unwillingness to
abide by solemn agreements to recognize as final and binding arbitration awards
rendered in disputes between it and American parties.”81
The use of trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards is best illustrated by the
ongoing dispute over Argentina’s refusal to honor adverse investment awards. On March
26, 2012, the Obama Administration announced that Argentina’s GSP beneficiary
designation would be suspended “because it has not acted in good faith in enforcing
arbitral awards in favor of United States citizens.”82 It was the first time in American
77.
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Basin Initiative); 19 U.S.C. § 3202(3) (2006) (same requirement with respect to benefits under the
Andean Trade Preference Act).
See, e.g., Generalized System of Preferences (GSP); Initiation of a Review to Consider the
Designation of Nigeria as a Beneficiary Developing Country Under the GSP; Solicitation of Public
Comments relating to the Designation Criteria, 65 Fed. Reg. 25972 (May 4, 2000); Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP); Initiation of a Review to Consider the Designation of Mongolia as a
Beneficiary Developing Country Under the GSP; Solicitation of Public Comments relating to the
Designation Criteria, 64 Fed. Reg. 3736 (Jan. 25, 1999).
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history the United States denied GSP trade benefits to a developing country for its
failure to honor arbitration commitments.83 “A remarkable achievement,” is how one
senior USTR official described the development.84
The decision was the culmination of an intense lobbying effort by American
corporations who had succeeded in arbitration against Argentina pursuant to the United
States-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, but were unsuccessful in securing
enforcement of those awards.85 The threat to suspend GSP benefits became a matter of
intense bilateral concern. When President Barack Obama and Argentine President
Christine Fernandez met for the first time in November 2011, the two heads of state
spent the majority of their time discussing Argentina’s obligation to pay the arbitration
awards, and the consequences that would flow from its failure to do so.86
The United States is clearly calculating that such trade sanctions will alter
Argentina’s cost-benefit analysis.87 Buenos Aires is set to pay approximately $18 million
annually in increased duties as a result of the GSP suspension, far below the $300
million it owes from the arbitration awards.88 Standing alone, the GSP suspension may
be an insufficient incentive to comply given that the annual cost in additional duties
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represents only six percent of one arbitration award. But when the trade sanctions are
considered in the context of other measures—such as limiting access to World Bank and
Inter-American Development Bank credit and loan facilities or refusing to support the
restructuring of Argentina’s $7 billion Paris Club debt—the combined result may nudge
Argentina toward compliance, or at least a post-award settlement.89 The combined
approach exposes Argentina to substantial risks, such as limiting its access to credit,
altering its credit rating, constricting its export market, and discouraging foreign
investment.
With the successful campaign to suspend Argentina’s GSP benefits, U.S. corporations
are now actively pursuing a similar tactic with respect to other countries. Chevron, in
particular, is lobbying the United States Trade Representative to suspend Ecuador’s
preferential trade status under the Andean Trade Preference Act (“ATPA”)90 because of
that country’s failure to honor arbitration awards in Chevron’s favor. USTR has warned
that Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa that he is in jeopardy of losing ATPA
beneficiary status.91 Ecuador is particularly vulnerable to losing its beneficiary status
because the other three ATPA beneficiary countries have already, or soon will no longer
be part of the program.92 The ATPA is unlikely to remain with Ecuador as the sole
beneficiary.93
Thus far proposed trade remedies to enforce arbitration awards have come in the
modest form of removing preferential trade benefits.
If that approach proves
unsuccessful, the United States could consider more drastic measures—such as Section
301 trade remedies.94 In 2011 Azurix filed a Section 301 petition, arguing that
Argentina’s refusal to pay the ICSID award constitutes an unjustifiable measure that
burdens U.S. commerce within the meaning of Section 301.95
89.
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The USTR has been reluctant to accept Section 301 petitions when an investor alleges
that a host country has expropriated its investment, reasoning that such claims should
be pursued in investment arbitration.96 But if an investor successfully pursues
arbitration and still is unable to collect against the host country, the justification for
pursuing a Section 301 action is enhanced.97 The overwhelming majority of Section 301
cases are concerned with foreign trade practices that impede exports or impose
impediments to U.S. investments abroad.98 Section 301 measures almost always are
designed with the same objectives as bilateral investment treaties: to benefit the U.S.
economy by promoting trade, foreign investment and export opportunities. Therefore, a
Section 301 action for refusing to recognize and enforce an arbitration award is plausible.
It is also possible that the United States could consider more draconian unilateral
remedies to pressure Argentina to comply with its obligations. Such measures may
include seizing assets, denying access to capital markets, imposing import bans, or
retaliatory tariffs against Argentine products. For example, proposed legislation in the
112th Congress would have required the Securities and Exchange Commission to take all
necessary measures to deny any “judgment evading foreign state” or state-owned
corporation thereof from access to United States capital markets, including the ability to
borrow money or sell securities in the United States.99 The purpose of such legislation,
according to its principal sponsor, was stop Argentina—“one of the largest scofflaws in
history” that shows “equal disregard for both U.S. and international law”—from
“inflicting further financial injury on the United States and its citizens.”100
To the extent such measures would violate WTO trade rules—by imposing
discriminatory internal regulations—the United States could argue that they are
permitted under a WTO general exception. Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 allows
Member States to take measures that are “necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement….”101 The

TRADE (Aug. 12, 2011), http://wtonewsstand.com/component/option,com_ppv/Itemid,445/
id,2372728/; Doug Palmer, U.S. Firm Eyes Trade Case to Enforce Argentina Payment, REUTERS,
(Aug. 8, 2011 5:48 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/usa-argentina-disputeidUSN1E7770XN20110808.; Arthur E. Appelton, Forum Selection in Trade Litigation, ICTSD
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TRADE
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(April
2013),
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2013/04/forum-selection-in-trade-litigation.pdf.
96. Petition Under 302 on Alleged Expropriations by the Dominican Republic, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,857
(July 15, 2011).
97. See Kallmer, supra note 84.
98. Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The
Limited Case for Section 301, 23 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 263, 264-65 (1992).
99. S. 912, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 1798, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
100. Rep. Connie Mack, U.S., Obama Must Hold Argentina Accountable, ROLL CALL, (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/57_56/connie_mack_us_obama_must_hold_argentina_accountable210136-1.html.
101. GATT, Art. XX(d). See Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled, and Frozen Beef, ¶157, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) (“[f]or a measure, otherwise
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WTO would not permit a measure that simply sought Argentina’s compliance with its
ICSID obligations.102 The “laws or regulations” contemplated by Article XX(d) refers to
“rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO member,” not “obligations of
another WTO member under an international agreement.”103 To the extent ICSID
awards are part of domestic United States law, measures necessary to secure such
compliance with those awards would arguably fall within Article XX(d).
Federal legislation implementing the ICSID Convention provides that an ICSID
award “shall create a right arising under a treaty of the United States” and that the
“pecuniary obligations imposed by such an award shall be enforced and shall be given the
same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction of one of the several States.”104 Thus, ICSID awards become enforceable
domestic judgments in the United States by virtue of 22 U.S.C. § 1650a. Accordingly,
compliance with an ICSID award is not simply a question of international law; it is also a
matter of federal law placing ICSID awards on the same footing as domestic court
judgments.
If the United States takes WTO-inconsistent action to pressure Argentina into
compliance, it can credibly argue that enforcement of judgments is a legitimate state
objective and that, having failed to collect on the judgments using alternative means,
unilateral trade measures are necessary to secure compliance with WTO-consistent
federal law.

VI. Investment Arbitration to Enforce Trade Obligations
Recourse to trade remedies to pursue the enforcement of arbitration awards is a
present reality. In the future, the convergence of trade and arbitration may include
recourse to investment arbitration to enforce international trade guarantees.
Specifically, umbrella clauses in bilateral investment treaties are being invoked to
enforce investment commitments in trade agreements.
There is extensive commentary on the meaning of umbrella clauses in BITs, with
particular focus on whether contract rights give rise to investment claims.105 Less

102.
103.
104.
105.

inconsistent with GATT 1994, to be justified provisionally under paragraph (d) of Article XX, two
elements must be shown. First, the measure must be one designed to ‘secure compliance’ with
laws or regulations that are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the GATT 1994.
Secondly, the measure must be ‘necessary’ to secure such compliance.”).
Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, ¶69,
WT/DS308 /AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006).
Id.
22 U.S.C. § 1650a.
See, e.g., JAN OLE VOSS, THE IMPACT OF INVESTMENT TREATIES ON CONTRACTS BETWEEN HOST
STATES AND FOREIGN INVESTORS 221-276 (2011); JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES, 271-284 (2010); STEPHAN W. SCHILL, Umbrella Clauses as Public Law Concepts in
Comparative Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 317
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common in the scholarly literature is whether a State’s other investment commitments
give rise to a BIT claim.106 There is virtually no discussion as to whether WTO
commitments, including provisions of the TRIMs Agreement, constitute an investment
obligation within the meaning of BIT umbrella clauses.
The scope of umbrella clauses is dependent on the language in particular BITs, which
varies widely from one treaty to the next.
Accordingly, there is no uniform
understanding as to the meaning of umbrella clauses. Narrow umbrella clauses are
unlikely vehicles for vindicating international trade rights. A treaty commitment to
observe any obligation a Contracting State “has assumed with regard to specific
investments” is unlikely to encompass legislative measures or treaty commitments.107
Broad umbrella clauses, by contrast, committing a Contracting Party to observe any
obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments are better candidates.108
ICSID tribunals have interpreted broad umbrella clauses to give investors treaty
rights with respect to unilateral undertakings of the State embodied in municipal law.109
In CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, the tribunal concluded that utility tariffs
designed to attract foreign investment were “legal … obligations pertinent to the
investment.”110

106.

107.

108.

109.
110.
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In LGE v. Argentina, the tribunal concluded that abrogation of
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guarantees made to investors in a statutory framework gave rise to liability under the
umbrella clause.111 In Enron v. Argentina, another tribunal concluded that the umbrella
clause referred to “any obligations regardless of their nature.”112 This included not only
contractual obligations, but also “obligations assumed through law or regulation” that
are “with regard to investments.”113 In Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, a
tribunal found that major legal and regulatory changes introduced by the State as part of
its public function constituted treaty violations under the umbrella clause.114 Finally, in
SGS v. Paraguay, a tribunal interpreted a broad umbrella clause as creating “an
obligation for the State to constantly guarantee observance of its commitments entered
into with respect to investments of investors of the other party. The obligation has no
limitations on its face—it apparently applies to all such commitments, whether
established by contract or by law, unilaterally or bilaterally.”115
Note that these sweeping pronouncements do not require that a State’s commitment
reference a specific investment or contract. As long as legislative or executive measures
relate to the promotion or regulation of investments, they constitute unilateral
undertakings covered by a broad umbrella clause. Such ICSID jurisprudence has led one
commentator to conclude that “tribunals overwhelmingly accept the application of
umbrella clauses to obligations assumed unilaterally by host States,” whether those
undertakings are “made through legislation or otherwise.”116 Another has opined that
“the current tide of jurisprudence concerning umbrella clauses is in favor of such clauses
encompassing host State commitments of all kinds.”117
Assuming such interpretations are correct—which is by no means clear—this has
significant implications for the WTO. If WTO obligations are subject to investment
arbitration, it would authorize private parties to initiate trade cases. Private rights of
action through investment arbitration would supplement the diplomatic espousal of
claims before the WTO.
This is precisely what one foreign investor has argued with respect to alleged WTO
violations as a result of Australia’s plain-packaging laws. On November 21, 2011, Philip
Morris Asia Ltd. filed an investment arbitration claim against Australia pursuant to the
111. LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E Int'l Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ¶175 (Oct. 3, 2006).
112. Enron Corp. Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
¶274 (May 22, 2007).
113. Id.
114. Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶310-313 (Sept.
28, 2007).
115. Société Général de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29, Award
¶167 (Feb. 12, 2012).
116. Salias, supra note 106, at 495.
117. Darius Chan, The High-Water Mark of an Umbrella Clause: SGS v. Paraguay, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 18, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/04/18/the-highwater-mark-of-an-umbrella-clause-sgs-v-paraguay/.
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Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty. The central contention of Philip
Morris is that Australia’s plain packaging legislation violated various international
obligations. Among the claims it filed is one under the broad “umbrella clause” in the
BIT, which provides that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may
have entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting
Party.”118 According to the Notice of Arbitration:
This [umbrella clause] obligation is broader than specific obligations … made by
the host State to investors…. It also encompasses other international obligations
binding on the host State that affect the way in which property is treated in
Australia…. [T]he relevant obligations are those enshrined in TRIPS, the Paris
Convention, and TBT. [Claimant] as an owner of the investments is entitled to
expect Australia to comply with its obligations pursuant to those treaties. By
adopting and implementing plain packaging legislation, Australia has failed to
observe and abide by those obligations.”119
In response, Australia argued that:
The meaning and scope of such provisions is a matter of great controversy.
However it is clear in the instant case that … the “umbrella clause” in Article 2(2)
cannot be understood as encompassing general obligations in multilateral
treaties…. Rather … the “umbrella clause” … only covers commitments that a host
State has entered into with respect to specific investments…. [T]he obligations
under the multilateral treaties … are not “obligations” which have been entered
into with regard to investments of investors” of Hong Kong, but are rather
obligations that operate on the inter-State level, with their own particular interState dispute resolution procedures.120
It is too early to assess the likely success of such claims, but if the recent “umbrella
clause” jurisprudence is accurate the claims are at least colorable.
Whether WTO commitments are obligations with regard to investments is a difficult
question. At one level, the entire WTO regime is intended, according to the Marrakesh
Declaration, to “lead to more … investment … throughout the world.”121 Therefore
virtually all WTO commitments will influence investment climates and investor decisions
in some form.122 At another level, one can identify specific WTO commitments in TRIMs,

118. Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-Austl., Sept. 15, 1993, 1770 U.N.T.S. 386,
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2011),
http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0666.pdf.
121. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, art.1 Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
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TRIPs, and GATs that provide significant investment protections.123 To the extent that
umbrella clause commitments extend to unilateral investment undertakings, at least
some WTO commitments implemented in domestic legislation would satisfy the
investment nexus.
This potential convergence of trade and arbitration has profound implications for the
resolution of WTO violations. An arbitration panel liberally construing a broad umbrella
clause could transform how WTO obligations are adjudicated.
How would the
adjudication of WTO obligations through investment arbitration alter the landscape?
First, umbrella clauses in BITs could create a private right of action for resolving
WTO disputes. Investment arbitration circumvents the traditional barriers to initiating
a WTO dispute. Diplomatic espousal is no longer a reliable check on the pursuit of
unmeritorious claims. Through umbrella clauses foreign investors could seek recourse
for violations of investment obligations that form part of WTO disciplines.
Second, with WTO dispute settlement the Member States control all decisions with
respect to adjudication and resolution of the dispute. Investors may prefer an alternative
dispute settlement process that places such decisions within their control. The incentives
to settle an investment dispute depend on satisfying investors concerns rather than
satisfying the disputing Member States’ concerns.
Third, with limited exceptions, the WTO prohibits unilateral trade remedies. Article
23 of the DSU provides that Member States “shall not make a determination to the effect
that a violation has occurred … except through recourse to dispute settlement in
accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”124 Investment
arbitration is not a unilateral remedy imposed in response to a WTO violation, but
neither is it WTO dispute settlement. Investment arbitration may provide a vehicle for
compensating or attenuating the harm caused to investors without offending the WTO
restrictions on unilateral trade remedies.
Fourth, WTO remedies are prospective, while investment arbitration remedies may be
retroactive. The goal of the WTO adjudication is to bring Member States into conformity
with their trade obligations.125 The goal of investment arbitration is, consistent with
traditional understandings of state responsibility, to “wipe-out all the consequences of

123. TRIMs prohibits any Member State from applying any investment measures in a manner that
violates national treatment or quantitative restrictions. TRIPs enhances the protection afforded
to firms investing in goods and services that are IP intensive. GATs protects cross-border supply
of services, cross-border movement of consumers and suppliers, and the commercial presence of
service providers. Id. at 243-250. As such, the WTO marks “an important watershed in
international rule-making by subjecting investment-related issues for the first time to the logic
and disciplines of multilateral trade diplomacy.” Id. at 241.
124. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 23(2)(a),
Apr. 15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].
125. DSU art. 19(1), 22.
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the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed
if that act had not been committed.”126
Fifth, under the WTO dispute settlement process, any losses an investor suffers as a
result of a Member State’s WTO violation are not compensable. WTO remedies
contemplate compensation directly to a Member State or, failing that, the suspension of
concessions paid directly to the Member State in the form of increased duties.127 With
investment arbitration, international law violations result in monetary compensation due
directly to the investor.
Thus, liberal interpretations of broad umbrella clauses that encompass investment
commitments in WTO undertakings may prove to be an attractive avenue for future
investment arbitration.

VII. Conclusion
The WTO and BITs are among the most significant legal developments in the history
of international economic law. Never before in the history of international relations has
trade and investment been supported by such powerful legal guarantees and adjudicative
processes. In less than two decades the WTO and BITs have permanently altered the
legal landscape with reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements designed to
reduce barriers to trade and investment and eliminate discriminatory treatment in
international economic relations.
In most respects the worlds of trade and investment are on parallel tracks headed in
the same direction. The ends are similar, but the means toward those ends are distinct.
The purpose of this essay has been to highlight discrete areas where a convergence of the
two disciplines is emerging. These points of convergence are limited, but significant.
The first point of convergence highlights the mutually reinforcing nature of trade and
investment. The guarantees in BITs and the WTO are baseline protections that reflect
international minimum standards that nations accord to every other trading partner.
Preferential trade agreements with investment chapters promote deep vertical
integration and efficient global production lines by minimizing trade costs, maximizing
market access, and harmonizing cross-border regulatory standards. The convergence of
trade and investment in deep PTAs is a reflection of the modern era of globalized chains
of supply.
The second point of convergence emphasizes the unifying commitment in both trade
and investment regimes against discrimination and protectionism.

While the WTO

126. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13); Draft Articles on
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the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”).
127. DSU art. 22.
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focuses on non-discrimination with respect to like products and services, BITs focus on
non-discrimination with respect to the regulation of similarly-situated foreign and
domestic investors. Despite the textual differences, in no other area of law has WTO
jurisprudence influenced the resolution of investment claims more than with respect to
BIT national treatment guarantees.
Given the similarities between trade and investment guarantees, the same factual
scenario may give rise to both WTO and BIT adjudication. Thus far we have seen such
parallel proceedings in less than a handful of cases, but the proliferation of BITs and BIT
investment arbitration will increase such opportunities. There is an obvious symmetry
between the two types of proceedings, with one looking forward and the other looking
backward.128 It should surprise no one that multinational corporations will pursue
investment claims before an arbitration forum created by States to promote the national
interest, while States determine that it is in the national interest to pursue a parallel
WTO claim.
The most innovative examples of the convergence between trade and arbitration are
with respect to the last two developments, both of which suggest that the two regimes are
mutually reinforcing. Investment arbitration was designed in a manner such that
recognition and enforcement of adverse investment awards was presumed.129 That is not
how things have played out, and the Argentina kerfuffle suggests that foreign investors
increasingly may pursue trade remedies to secure enforcement of investment arbitration
awards. Conversely, the WTO was designed so that, with limited exceptions, trade
disputes would be resolved before the WTO dispute settlement body. But liberal
interpretations of broad umbrella clauses may afford foreign investors the opportunity to
adjudicate investment commitments embedded in the WTO agreements before BIT
tribunals. With these two developments we may see a future in which trade remedies
reinforce investment guarantees, and investment remedies reinforce trade guarantees.
The broader implications of this convergence between trade and investment
arbitration remain unclear. Much depends on the frequency with which these points of
convergence occur. With one exception—preferential trade agreements with investment
128. See Brooks E. Allen, The Use of Non-Pecuniary Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement: Lessons for
Arbitral Practitioners, in ASA SPECIAL SERIES NO. 30: PERFORMANCE AS A REMEDY: NONMONETARY RELIEF IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 281, 281 (Michael E. Schneider & Joachim
Knoll eds., 2011).
129. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States art. 53(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 12709, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID
Convention](“The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or
to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each party shall abide by and
comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed
pursuant to the relevant provisions of this Convention.”). See also ICSID art. 54(1)(“Each
Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final
judgment of a court in that State.”).
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chapters—convergence is an infrequent and occasional event. Investment tribunals
occasionally have relied on WTO jurisprudence, but the WTO dispute settlement body
almost never relies on investment tribunal jurisprudence.130 Parallel trade and
investment proceedings have occurred on only three occasions, even though there have
been over 450 WTO complaints filed,131 over 180 WTO panel reports issued,132 and over
388 concluded or pending ICSID cases.133 One cannot make too much of parallel
proceedings if they occur in less than one percent of all trade or investment disputes.
Recourse to trade remedies in order to enforce arbitration awards is a new development
and only time will tell whether the Argentina scenario is sui generis. Foreign investors
have relied on umbrella clauses to enforce investment commitments in trade agreements,
but no investment tribunal has ruled to that effect.
The convergence of trade and investment has taken hold with investment chapters in
preferential trade agreements. Convergence of the two disciplines with respect to
dispute resolution is a nascent development. To the extent convergence occurs with
greater frequency, we may soon call it a trend. Scholars today are actively encouraging
broad and deep convergence of the two disciplines.134 Perhaps further convergence will
portend a future unified international economic law.135
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Finally, the convergence of trade and investment raises broader theoretical questions.
Numerous actors have pursued the various convergences outlined in this essay:
diplomats, bureaucrats, corporations, adjudicators, practitioners, and scholars. Typically
they are not concerned with theoretical questions of global constitutionalism,
fragmentation, incoherence, or cosmopolitan community. For them, international law is
not a progressive, liberal project; it is a vehicle to solve real-world problems. How can we
protect globalized chains of supply? How can we open foreign markets for our
constituents? How should we interpret ambiguous text in a treaty? How can we secure
compensation for past harm and prevent future harm? How can we exert sufficient
economic pressure to force a recalcitrant party to recognize an award? How can we
prevent a government from regulating away our intellectual property?
When actors seek to engage such problems, they are willing to use every tool
available, regardless of the label. This practical reality raises important theoretical
questions. International trade and investment law reflect institutional manifestations of
structural bias, and a choice to pursue one avenue or the other creates path dependency.
Defining a problem as a trade dispute or an investment dispute is a strategic decision,
allowing the expert to refer to a “technical idiom so as to open the door for applying the
expertise related to that idiom, together with the attendant structural bias.”136 Powerful
interest groups will attempt to define the problem in a way that furthers their interests,
and will invoke whatever language is necessary. Fragmentation and convergence both
present opportunities and obstacles.
For such actors, international law is not “a kind of secular faith,” a “placeholder for
the vocabularies of justice and goodness.”137 Rather, international law regimes are
utilitarian constructs, necessary expedients to achieve a desired end.
Regime
convergence occasionally furthers those ends. The fact that these regimes are perceived
as effective to achieve the desired ends speaks volumes about the relevance of
international law.
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